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I
n April 2010, the Ontario government announced 
another reduction in the maximum price of gen-
eric drugs permitted under the Ontario Drug Bene-
fit  (ODB)  program,  demanding  that  generic  drugs  now 
be sold for no more than 25% of the branded product’s 
price.1 This represents the third modification to Ontario’s 
original pricing policy adopted in 1993 and a 50% drop 
from its previous maximum price for generics.2 Other 
provinces are following Ontario in setting unprecedent-
edly low price-caps to reduce the cost of generic drugs.  In 
July 2010, the government of British Columbia changed 
its maximum price-cap for generics to 40% of the branded 
product price effective July 2011, and 35% of the branded 
product price effective April 2012.3 In Quebec, as in New-
foundland and Labrador, policies require generic com-
panies selling to the province to match their lowest price 
in Canada, effectively rendering prices in those provinces 
the same as in Ontario.4 Other provincial governments 
have made no recent publicized changes to policies re-
garding the pricing of generics, but there is an expecta-
tion that policy-makers across Canada will be influenced 
by the Ontario regulations.5   
The  BC  government  has  stated  that  it  expects  its  new 
price-cap on generics to save taxpayers up to $380 million 
annually,6 whil e Quebec estima tes ann ual savings of $ 1 64 
million.7 Yet, although price-caps may reduce generic drug 
prices in the provinces relative to previous years, there is 
little evidence that Canadian pricing regulations promote 
generic drug prices that are low by international standards. 
Currently, Canadian generic drug prices are among the 
highest in the industrialized world.8 In a 2008 international 
price comparison, the lowest generic drug prices among 12 
countries reviewed were noted to exist in the United States, 
where no price-caps are in place and there is free competi-
tion among generics.9 Despite evidence of lower-priced gen-
erics in the US free-market setting, provincial governments 
in Canada continue to set price-caps, at various levels, in an 
attempt to reduce generic drug prices. However, analyses 
of international drug prices and policies suggest that price-
caps may result in higher-priced generics than would exist 
without regulation,9, 10 and there is further concern that ex-
tremely low price-caps may impede market entry for new 
generic products.11  
Generic drugs, reimbursement, and pricing 
regulations in Canada
In Canada, manufacturers of pharmaceuticals are pro-
vided  patent  protection  for  new  drug  products  for  a 
period of 20 years.12 Because a drug under patent protec-
tion is available from only one manufacturer, it is called 
a “single source” drug.13 Once patent protection ends, 
competing manufacturers may produce and sell a gen-
eric version of the drug, provided they prove to Health 
Canada that the generic product is bioequivalent to the 
original.4 After a patent expires and generic equivalents 
of the branded drug enter the market, the drug is called 
“multiple source,” meaning that both branded and gen-
eric versions of the drug are available from different 
manufacturers.13 Among generics, a distinction is made 
between “branded” generics, which still compete partly 
on brand image, and “unbranded” generics, which com-
pete solely on price.14 Branded generics are often made 
by the same manufacturer that produces the originator 
product,  and  are  then  known  as  “fighting  generics,” 
“pseudo-generics” or “authorized generics.”2,15 Because 
generics, particularly unbranded generics,9 are equal in 
safety and effectiveness to brand-name drugs while being 
marketed at a lower price, they can significantly reduce 
costs to consumers and to provincial drug programs and 
private insurers. All provinces now have legislation that 
either permits or requires pharmacists to dispense the 
least expensive interchangeable drug product equivalent 
to that prescribed, i.e., a generic when available.4,16
Each provincial drug plan has a formulary that lists 
all drug products eligible for coverage and the reimburse-
ment fee that will be paid when the drug is dispensed.8,17 
To determine reimbursement fees for each drug product 
by dosage form,18 each provincial government follows its own protocol.8 In Ontario, drug manufacturers are invit-
ed to submit the price of their product when applying for 
inclusion in the ODB formulary.2 For single-source drugs, 
the formulary price or best available price (BAP) is, by de-
fault, the price submitted by the drug’s only manufactur-
er. For multiple-source drugs, the lowest price submitted 
by any manufacturer in an interchangeable drug category 
is designated as the BAP and is listed on the formulary. 
Historically, the tendering process to establish the BAP in 
Ontario has been used to determine not the sole provider 
of a drug, but the price point at which pharmacies will be 
reimbursed when a product is dispensed: that is, after the 
BAP has been set, there are no special provisions for the 
generic manufacturer who submitted the lowest price.13 
Although Ontario has recently tried a new tendering pro-
cess that awards “preferential listing” to the manufacturer 
who submits the lowest bid, this has been applied to only 
4  drugs  (enalapril  tablets,  gabapentin,  metformin  and 
ranitidine  tablets).16  Generally,  when  several  equivalent 
generics are available, it is at the pharmacy’s discretion to 
decide which ones to stock and dispense.19 Unlike several 
other provinces, Ontario uses the BAP method alone and 
does not consider actual acquisition cost (AAC), meaning 
that reimbursement fees do not depend on what a phar-
macy paid for the drug product.17 This has meant that if 
a pharmacy can negotiate with manufacturers to pay less 
than the BAP, it can earn additional profits by still submit-
ting for reimbursement at the BAP.16,17
Provincial policies requiring pharmacists to dispense 
the lowest-priced interchangeable drug product, effect-
ively mandating pharmacists to dispense generics, is 
key to reducing the cost of provincial drug plans in Can-
ada.20,21 Yet, in order to maximize savings, provincial 
governments must also seek the lowest possible prices 
for generics. Introduced in 1993, Ontario’s “75/90” regu-
lation was the first legislation to limit the price of generic 
drugs entering the market. Under the 75/90 program, to 
be designated and listed on the ODB formulary the first 
generic entrant was required to be priced at no more 
than 75% of the original brand-name product price; 
subsequent generics were required to be no more than 
90% of the price of the first generic. The 75/90 regula-
tions were amended to “70/90” in 1998 and to “50/90” in 
2006, making Ontario’s most recent price-cap of 25% of 
the brand price a 50% price reduction from the province’s 
previous maximum price for generics. Today, Ontario, 
Quebec, British Columbia and Alberta use price-caps for 
generic drugs based on the price of the branded product. 
In British Columbia, as of July 2011, all generics regard-
less of list date will have to be priced at or lower than 
40% of the brand price; this price-cap will drop to 35% 
on 2 April 2012.3 In Alberta, as of April 2010, all gener-
ics listed before October 2009, must be priced no higher 
than 56% of the price of the branded drug, while new 
generics listed after October 2009 must be priced at 45% 
of the price of the branded drug.22 In Quebec, legislation 
passed in 2007 limited the price of the first generic en-
trant to 60% of the price of the brand-name drug and 
subsequent generics to 54% of the branded  drug, yet the 
province ultimately requires manufacturers to match 
the lowest formulary prices offered elsewhere in Can-
ada.4 Currently, transitional price-caps are in place in 
Quebec to allow manufacturers to adjust and to meet the 
new price-caps established in Ontario no later than April 
2012.23 Although no price-caps are in place in Manitoba, 
since 2007 the province has required that manufactur-
ers of new generic drugs declare that the price submitted 
to the government is less than or equal to the price of the 
product elsewhere in Canada.16
International generic drug prices and policies
Although the new price-caps in Canada may be effective 
in reducing generic drug prices in comparison with pre-
vious years, it is unknown whether these regulations can 
achieve their ultimate goal: the lowest possible prices 
for generics. Although generic drugs are always cheaper 
than their brand-name equivalents, there is substantial 
international variation in the price of generic drugs. 
In Simoens’ 2007 comparison of selected generic drug 
prices in 10 countries worldwide,24 the average price (in 
2005 Euros) across the selected molecules and strengths 
ranged from a low of € 0.075 in India, to a median of 
€ 0.220 in Finland, to a high of € 0.269 in Germany. The 
difference between the highest and lowest price in the 
countries surveyed was noted to be even greater for cer-
tain molecules at specific strengths: for example, the an-
algesic tramadol (50 mg) was found to be 6 times more 
expensive in Belgium than in Denmark, while the acid 
reducer ranitidine (150 mg) was found to be 36 times 
more expensive in France than in India. Even these few 
examples illustrate the simple fact that generic drug 
manufacturers do not set a single price for their product. 
Rather, drug manufacturers adapt their prices strategic-
ally to different settings, evidently according to a nation’s 
unique combination of socio-economic characteristics 
and government policies.25
Although Simoens24 remarked that the average price of 
generics is higher in European nations with a “free-mar-
ket” approach, which he defined as Finland, Germany and 
the  United  Kingdom,  arguably  no  accurate  conclusions 
regarding the impact of different pricing regulations can 
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one, Simoens gave no justification for excluding India, the 
country with the lowest-priced generics, from his calcula-
tion of average prices. In India, although certain essential 
medicines are price-controlled, generic drug prices are 
otherwise set by manufacturers.12,24 Furthermore, France 
and the Netherlands, two highly regulated markets, were 
observed to have the second- and third-highest priced 
generics in Europe. The Netherlands uses a “maximum 
price” system based on average prices in neighbouring 
countries, whereas France uses a price-cap based on the 
price of the branded product.10,24 These observations run 
counter to the conclusion that a free-market approach 
functions to increase the price of generics, and oppose the 
use of the simplistic measure of mean prices among se-
lected countries to determine the effect of regulations on 
generic drug prices.  
Danzon has noted the difficulties inherent in cross-
national comparisons of drug prices arising from dif-
ferences between nations with respect to available drug 
products and formulations.25,26 Studies that undertake 
between-country comparisons of drug prices must de-
termine in advance what matching criteria will be em-
ployed, i.e., what drug product characteristics must be 
the same before drugs are compared. Requiring precise 
matching produces precise comparisons, but compari-
sons based on a limited and potentially unrepresentative 
subset of drugs.25 To analyze drug prices in 2005, Dan-
zon and Furukawa25 constructed two separate price in-
dices to compare selected countries to the United States, 
matching drug products either by active ingredient and 
indication or these two criteria plus strength and formu-
lation. The price for each drug product matched was de-
fined at the manufacturer level, weighted by US volume 
weights, and reported in US dollars. On the basis of their 
analysis, the authors made these key conclusions: first, 
differences in drug prices generally approximate differ-
ences in income among the countries surveyed, likely 
reflecting pricing strategies among drug manufacturers. 
Second,  the  unregulated,  competitive  US  market  pro-
motes comparatively high prices for single-source drug 
products, but comparatively low prices for generics. Con-
versely, more highly regulated markets are successful in 
achieving  lower  prices  for  single-source  products,  but 
not for generics.
Price-caps on generic drug prices in Canada: 
what effects can we expect?
Although regulations on generic drug prices have be-
come stricter in Canada since Ontario’s introduction 
of the 75/90 regulations, evidence suggests that 
Canadian generic drug prices have been increas-
ing relative to those in the United States. In Danzon 
and Furukawa’s analysis of 2005 prices, the price of 
branded and unbranded generics was found to be 33% 
higher in Canada than in the United States, while the 
price of unbranded generics alone was found to be 5 
times higher in Canada. This is in stark contrast to the 
results of their study of prices in 1999,14 which showed 
generics  in  Canada  to  be  priced  6%  lower  than  in 
the United States. Although the cause of this relative 
price  increase  cannot  be  drawn  from  observational 
data, the trend is consistent with evidence that price-
caps may be ineffective at promoting the lowest pos-
sible prices for generic drugs. In a previous study, we 
compared drug prices in the periods before and after 
the introduction of Ontario’s 75/90 regulations2 and 
found that, in both periods, the price of generic drugs 
fell as the number of generics entering the market in-
creased, yet the magnitude of decrease in prices was 
significantly lower after the introduction of the 75/90 
regulations than before. These findings suggest that 
the price-cap regulations did not reduce generic drug 
prices in Ontario, but rather resulted in a clustering of 
prices around the maximum allowable levels.
A 2010 review of the effects of European pricing 
regulations similarly concludes that price-caps result 
in a levelling-off of generic prices at a higher level than 
would occur in the absence of regulation.10 In regulat-
ed markets in Europe, Puig-Junoy observed that the 
entry of new generic competitors lowers prices paid 
by pharmacies, but not prices paid by government 
drug plans.10  Prices  paid  by  pharmacies  for  generic 
drugs are lowered when manufacturers provide com-
petitive discounts as an incentive to dispense their 
product over another generic. The same phenomenon 
exists  in  Canada:  in  2007,  the  Competition  Bureau 
of Canada issued a report concluding that, although 
pharmacy invoice prices consistently reflect the max-
imum prices allowed under provincial drug plans, net 
pharmacy prices are anywhere from 20%–60% of in-
voice prices after factoring in pharmacy “professional 
allowances.”16  Professional  allowances,  otherwise 
known as competitive pharmacy discounts10  or “kick-
backs,”19 are a reflection of the fact that manufactur-
ers can offer more competitive prices than they offer 
the government.  According to the Canadian Generic 
Pharmaceutical  Association,  there  are  currently  9 
“finished dosage” manufacturers of generic drugs in 
Canada.27 However, price-cap regulations set a ceiling 
for retail prices that these competing manufacturers 
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have no incentive to undercut. Instead, generic manufac-
turers compete at the pharmacy level, while regulations 
prevent the savings resulting from competition from 
being passed on to third-party payers. Evidence of sig-
nificant discounts to pharmacies by generic drug manu-
facturers is the driving force behind Ontario’s move to 
disallow professional allowances,28 yet prohibiting phar-
macies from realizing the savings from competition does 
not function to pass these savings on to government. 
Banning  professional  allowances  means  that  generic 
manufacturers will have to compete on attributes out-
side of cost, such as product range and other value-added 
services, which will have unknown effects on utilization 
but will not promote prices below the established ceiling. 
Beyond levelling off generic prices at a point higher 
than might be observed without regulation, price-caps 
may  give  brand-name  drug  companies  the  power  to 
inhibit the market entry of new generic products. This 
follows from the fact that under price-cap regulations 
the price of a generic product is tied to the price of the 
branded product. New generic drugs would be prevented 
from entering the market if branded firms were to stra-
tegically “limit price,” that is, to lower their price to the 
level where the retail price of the generic is forced below 
the marginal cost of production. Without knowing gen-
eric firms’ manufacturing costs, policy-makers can only 
estimate a price level for generic drugs that is low for 
consumers, yet viable for manufacturers. To date, prov-
incial drug plans in Canada utilizing price-caps have set 
them arbitrarily in relation to the price of the branded 
product,  adjusting  them  haphazardly  over  time.  This 
guesswork may be risky as price-caps are dropped lower 
and lower, as at some level a price-cap will threaten the 
viability of generics that may already be competitively 
priced.11 Since provincial governments in Canada do not 
know generic drug manufacturers’ “bottom line,” price-
cap regulations cannot be evidence-informed, and pay-
ers and consumers face a double-edged sword: based on 
observational data from the United States, it is conceiv-
able that many generics would be priced lower than 25% 
of the branded product price in the absence of regula-
tion. Berndt and Aitken have shown that declines in gen-
eric prices are becoming deeper and more rapid, with the 
average price among the top 25 generics in the US now 
dropping to about 6% of the initial generic market entry 
price after 26 months.29 Yet Berndt and Aitken also note 
that the percent reduction in average daily treatment 
cost for drugs across major therapy areas 2 years after 
generic entry ranges from 8% for proton pump inhibit-
ors to 84% for the bisphosphonates.29 Ostensibly, manu-
facturing costs vary across drug products in different 
therapy areas. It follows that certain generic products 
with higher manufacturing costs may not be profitable if 
they are sold for 25% of the branded product price, and if 
so, generic drug companies will lose the incentive to pro-
duce them in settings with this price-cap in place. Thus, 
for certain drugs, price-caps may prevent generics from 
ever entering the market, leaving no choice but to pay top 
dollar for the branded drug.  
Conclusions
The generic drug industry is essential to the Canadian 
health care system. In recent years, cost escalation in 
physician and hospital costs have been partly offset by 
provincial drug program policies demanding generic 
substitutes for branded drug products.30 Generic prod-
uct substitution legislation is vital to reducing costs to 
provincial drug plans,2,26 yet lower and lower price-caps 
may undo some of the benefits of substitution legisla-
tion if generics find it difficult to survive.  In the event 
that one or more branded products cannot be profitably 
produced as a generic under the latest price-caps, prov-
incial drug plans will be required to continue to subsid-
ize the purchase of the single-source product at a much 
higher unit cost. Instead of experimenting with different 
price-caps every few years without evidence regarding 
their potential effects, the provinces may well be advised 
to allow generic manufacturers to compete directly as a 
means of reducing generic drug prices. Currently, some 
of the lowest generic drug prices in the world are seen in 
the United States, where there is free competition among 
generics.9 Many of the same forces thought to contrib-
ute to low prices in the United States already exist in 
Canada, such as the presence of large chain pharmacies 
and mass merchandisers, the immense buying power of 
which can effectively compel generic manufacturers to 
compete on price. Yet, in Canada, where the combined 
buying  power  of  the  provinces  would  be  substantial, 
regulation prohibits such competition from taking place 
and generic prices here are increasing relative to the 
United States.9,14 Although academia continues to study 
the comparative effects of regulation and competition on 
drug pricing, Canadian policy-makers should take notice 
of international trends and use the evidence that is al-
ready available to inform pricing policies around generic 
drugs.
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